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BAR BRIEFS

ference with pregnancy. HELD: That, regardless of whether defendant performed the operation, he was guilty of the grossest negligence in the care administered, and the jury was justified in finding
that such negligence was responsible for death; and that plaintiff was
entitled to recover, as damages, the value of the loss of work and services which he was reasonably entitled to expect from her, also, for expenses of the funeral, but not for the loss of the society and companionship of such unmarried daughter.
State ex rel Friend et al vs. District Court et al. As part of a
mass of litigation it appears that G-B Company defaulted in a garnishment proceeding against it, judgment being also by default against the
main defeiidant. In the delay that followed, disputes arose between
stockholders in G-13 Company, some of which stipulated to dismiss
proceedings to set aside the default. Action was then commenced in
State District Court to have the property of G-B Company sequestered
and receiver appointed. Receiver was appointed by the State Court,
possession taken and regular course pursued. Within four months
petition in bankruptcy was filed in U. S. District Court by creditors of
G-B Company. HELD: That the Supreme Court, under its power
of supervision over inferior courts, will intervene in such case and
enjoin further proceedings by the State Court and the receiver until
the detennination of the issue in the federal court, in order to avoid
a possible conflict of jurisdiction, but that such injunction will not
extend to the payment of necessary expenses, such as rent and clerk
hire, to protect the business.
THE PUBLIC-AND A CODE OF ETHICS
The August issue of the American Bar Association Journal contains an article on "Does the Public Need a Code of Ethics Too"? by
Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, formerly of the Supreme Court of North
Dakota. In the same issue appears, also, an editorial, entitled "The
Party of the Third Part", which we quote in full, towit:
No problem, least of all one so complicated as that of the administration of justice, can be understood or dealt with effectively unless
all of the main agencies involved are given due attention. For this
reason it is well from time to time to turn from the responsibility of
the Bench and Bar in this important field and consider the obligations
and performance of the party of the third part-perhaps the party of
the first part from the standpoint of importance-viz: the public.
For it may be taken for granted that unless there is co-operation of
all three factors to a reasonable extent, no results of real importance
are likely to be achieved.
The public is, of course, a vague and elusive entity, and, in consequence, it is generally defined in accordance with the particular need
of the occasion. Sometimes it is idealized as an impeccable, disinterested, patriotic body that is deeply resentful of defects in the administration of justice and that is demanding that they should be done away
with on pain of its grave displeasure. Sometimes it is denounced as a
body of indifferent citizens who neglect their duties at the polls and
thereby permit the wrong sort of men and measures to prevail. Sometimes, when subjected to examination such as appears in Judge Johnson's article, it appears to be made up in considerable part of voters who
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are willing to violate their duty. not by mere abstentioii from participation in public functions, but by active sulpport and advocacy of men
and measures that. by the most ordinary standards of propriety, are
not entitled to support. Sometimes, as has been demonstrated recently
in Chicago at a judicial election, and doubtless in other communities, it
appears made up to a large extent of voters who are quite willing, once
the situation is put clearly before them. to repudiate boss control and
manifest independence in the selection of members of the Bench. The
actual public, in contrast with the idealized one, is, of course, made
up to some extent of all these elements, and the p~roportion., at any
one time will depend on circumstances and the activity and influence
of particular leaders.
It is this somewhat elsive body that affects the administration
of justice by its general attitude towards the law and its enforcenment;
by the standards which it applies in the election of public officials
charged directly or indirectly with duties in that regard ; by its willingness or unwillingness to participate in the public functions of the State
in a variety of -ways; by its readiness to follow or to disregard the
counsels of experience where changes in methods seem desirable. And
here its attitude not only determines the manner in which tile public
will discharge its Own immediate duty in this regard, -but also has a
marked effect on the way in which the agents of justice discharge theirs.
As Judge Johnson says: "It is but an affirmation of the simple fact that
men are not divested of their human attributes mierely because they
become members of tie Bar or are exalted to the judicial office, to say
that they are susceptible to the subtle influence which public sentiment in a republic has upon mnt. Unknowingly and unconsciously,
perhaps, but certainly for good or ill, they feel the pressure of the
prevailing standards. In mnmst cases, doubtless, whel that pressure
becomes consciously felt and, therefore, directly offensive, judges
resist it to the utmnost when contrary to legal iprinciples or subversive
of the judicial oath; but inl the majority of instances the influence
is not felt in that way. It is there notwithstanding. li ke the atniosphere which surrounds the earth, its pressure is steady and irresistible.
We may not feel it; we may tnot know or sense it; yet, like the mists
which seem to penetrate solid walls, the sure and subtle power of public
opinion.is ever upOni its."

Such being the case it is qtuite evident that a constant education
of the public in right standard, of adnministering justice is one of the
most important things that canl be prolposed to improve conditions.
Bar Associations are doing somethinmg in this direction, but the cooperation of other agencies is needed. Certainly as long as a large
proportion of the Americam people think of law in terms of pugilistic
contests between opp simig cOttisel, and are willing to be mere spectators
instead of realizing their functions as helpful agents in its enforcements, the best laid plans of l1ench and Bar for iniprovement are going
to meet with umnecessary obstacles. Imilrovencnts will, of cotrse, be
nVide, and are slo wly being made all the time; but progress has to
carry a heavy weight due to outworn ideas mid primitive survivals in
the public mind, which are stimnilated fromt tilime to time by shortsighted orators accustomed to deliver reflex addresses, -it every suggestion for improvenment, ol the dangers to our anticit liberties.
While the process of education is going on, it would be well for
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legislators and others dealing with problems connected with the administration of justice to keep clearly in mind the real third factor
in such problems instead of the idealized factor. The public as it is,
with all its virtues and its defects, with its possibilities of being misled as well as its willingness, if sufficiently impressed, to respond to
the right sort of an appeal, is fairly well known. The idealized public
does not exist except as an ideal which is very far from being attained.
If the real public is kept in mind, and particularly if the real public
is brought to understand just what it is doing and ought to do in the
inturests of law and an orderly administration of law, plans for everything from probation and parole to the expedition of trials and the
election of judges will be much more practical and productive of
tangible results.
MAKESHIFT LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
At the annual meeting President McIntyre fittingly called attention
to the unwarranted manner in which emergency clauses are sometimes
attached to legislative enactments. May one not suggest, with just as
much propriety, however, that some of our so-called thoroughly-considered laws have rather strange inconsistencies, or are administered
in inconsistent ways?
Let us refer to the Compensation Law for an example. Supposedly, it is a compulsory law. The compulsory feature is somewhat
destroyed, however, by the practical effects of administrative procedure. One of the elements of the compulsion is found in Section i i
of the Act, which specifies that claims may be filed in case the employer was not insured, "and the Bureau shall hear and determine
such application for compensation in like manner as in other claims
before the Bureau ;" then, in case of award, the employer must pay it.
But, instead of continuing the informality of the regular claims,
which are very largely ex-parte proceedings. in which the machinery
of the Bureau is used to assist the claimant in proving his claim, tile
mail who is NO)T- insured really gets a better (teal than the one who is
insured; for wten it appears than the employer specified in a claim
is not covered by insurance, a majority of four to one oit the Bureau
favors dismissal of the clain oil the ground of "no-insurance." That
procedure makes it necessary for the claimant to file a new claim
(which the Burean calls an "elective") or sue his employer directly
in court. The practical effect of the first dismissal, however, is to
make ninety per cent of such claimants think that all of their rights
have been detertiined in that dismissal. and they take no further
action. A widow, whose htusband was killed in the course of his
employment, is now presenting that very contention in a specific case.
Suppose, however, that an "elective" claim is filed. Is the procedure of the regular claitis followed? By to means. It is required
that petition.ts and answers must be filed and served; that a day of
hearing be set ; that proof and counterproof be presented and received;
that practically all of tile formalities of court procedure, including
long delays, shall be part of the pe'forinince.
This question appears to Ie pertinent: Why should one whom
the compulsory features of the Act have NOT brought within its
termts be accorded more consideration in tle way of constitutional
formalities than the one who has coniplied Iby" the payments of prenituns? The law itself, aside front administrative practice, does accord

